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What is the role  of public  issues education  in renegotiating  the social
contract?  In trying to answer that question, I have found the 1994 debate on
health care reform instructive.'
Health Care Reform
People have been trying to renegotiate the health care contract for nearly
a  century.  Failed  efforts  occurred  during  the Wilson,  FDR,  Truman and
Nixon administrations.Finally,  in  1994, it looked like national health care
reform was going to happen. Public opinion supported reform (Schlesinger
and  Lee;  Jacobs;  Jacobs  and  Shapiro).  Escalating  insurance  premiums,
exclusionary  practices, such  as preexisting-condition  provisions and  cost
shifting by employers that made even middle-class families nervous about
insurance  coverage,  combined  to  produce  growing  public  support  for
reform,  in spite of continued skepticism about government involvement in
most other areas  (Peterson,  1994).
Interest groups were ready for reform. The solid front of opposition was
breaking down, as internal divisions appeared between general practitioners
and  specialists,  for-profit  and  not-for-profit  hospitals,  small  and  large
insurance  companies,  small  and  large businesses  (Peterson,  1993).  The
American Medical  Association  finally acknowledged  that the health care
system had faults that needed correction; insurance companies were realiz-
ing that they could not much longer get away with the practice of looking
for  "ever-smaller  pools  of healthier  people  to  insure,,;  businesses  were
exasperated  by ballooning health insurance  costs; many small  firms were
finding  that  they  could  no  longer  afford  coverage  of any  kind  for  their
employees  (Skocpol,  1993,  pp.  532-33).  Lobbyists  for education,  correc-
tions, welfare  and other causes  were  increasingly  critical of a health  care
nonsystem that sucked resources from their priorities and still left 15 percent
of the population without coverage (Brown,  p. 200).
Politicians  advocated  reform,  especially  after  Clinton's  victory  and
Harris  Wofford's  surprising  election  to  Congress on a health  care reform
platform.  Clinton  promised  a  proposal.  But  then  what  happened?  The
Clinton proposal was delayed, and it was thick and complicated when it did
arrive. The very size of the proposal made  it vulnerable  to criticism. From
84the start, the concept was a hard one to communicate. Instead of  a simple basic
idea, like "prohibitthe sale ofalcohol" or "guarantee voting rights for minorities,"
health  care  reform  called  for balancing two  seemingly  contrary  objectives,
controlling cost and extending coverage (Heclo).2 Moreover, the Clinton plan
relied heavily on regional health care alliances,  an unfamiliar mechanism that
raised suspicions which were hard to counteract (Skocpol,  1995).
Interest groups mobilized against the plan."Hospitals  [said] they would not
have  enough  money  to provide  medical  care  to everyone  who [needed]  it.
Insurance  companies  [said]  that the  plan  would prevent them  from  raising
enough money to pay the ... bills. Doctors [said] the government [did] not have
the right to force them to work for lower wages and that the plan would not give
them  enough resources  to take proper  care  of their patients.  Pharmaceutical
companies [said] the price controls would prevent them from developing ...  new
drugs.... Many small companies [said] the new costs [might] drive them out of
business.  Larger employers  [said]  the ... requirements  [would  give them]  an
incentive to replace [part-time employees] with [temporaries]" (Castro, pp. 210-
12).
In response to these developments, the public (in a public issues educator's
nightmare)  actually  became  de-informed.  In  opinion  polls,  the  percentage
saying they knew "a lot" about the Clinton plan actually went down when the
debate over the plan was in the news. Daniel Yankelovich's commentary about
this  is interesting (Yankelovich,  1995).  Consistent with what he  has written
elsewhere (Yankelovich,  1991 )-namely, that creating awareness of  problems
is the easy part-he notes that, even though most people claim to be satisfied
with their own health care, the sense of a need to overhaul the system had risen
to majority  levels.  But a closer look  at public opinion showed that the main
concern was the cost of health  care, and the solution was to cut the profits of
hospitals, lawyers, physicians and drug companies. Yankelovich points out that
experts were more likely to blame the aging ofthe population and the cost of  new
technology, and to foresee a need to limit care. From that perspective, the public
was guilty of"wishful thinking" and failure to grapple with hard choices. Indeed,
the more  that critics of the Clinton  plan  raised the  specter of tax increases,
restrictions on choice  of doctors, and employers forced  to cut jobs in order to
reduce health care costs, the more that public support for reform withered.
Congress began developing alternative plans, which further confused the
public,  and, in the end, Congress lost the will to act and gave up.
Information vs.  Agreement
Did health care reform  fail because  we didn't know enough? That is not
my impression. The problems were well-understood. It is true that there was
85uncertainty about likely budget impacts. There was fear that the plan would
be too costly,  and  consensus  never developed  on just what the  impacts
would be. But that kind of uncertainty  is inevitable.
A  better  explanation  for the  failure  of health  care  reform  was  lack  of
agreement. The emerging consensus that something needed to be done was what
Paul Starr had called a "negative consensus" (Marmor, p. 194, quoting Starr)-
agreement that change was needed, but no agreement on what form it should
take.  Poor information about  likely budget impacts may have aggravated the
disagreement, but the road between  information  and agreement  runs  in two
directions. If lack of good information makes agreement difficult, it is also true
that disagreement complicates the task of getting good information by giving
people incentives to exaggerate and to be less than honest.
Efforts at Agreement
So why  was  agreement  not reached?  It  looked  as  if the  long-elusive
agreement on health care reform was about to happen, but then it fell apart.
It appears to me that there  were three  important efforts at agreement that
need to be analyzed.  Why didn't they work?
1. The most obvious effort at agreement was the Clinton task force. It was
clear that any successful reform effort would require  consensus-building.
The task force was dominated by government officials and experts-a fact
that made it more easily attacked as big government (Skocpol, 1995). It was
not a stakeholder group  with the various  interest groups represented.  The
interest groups were consulted in order to identify ideas and concerns to take
into  account, but not for purposes of political  bargaining.  The task force
worked  largely  in  secret.  The  intention  was  to  "conclude  much  of the
process of compromise before the legislation went to Capitol Hill" (Castro,
p. 208). As several analysts have put it, the administration was still working
in "campaign mode" (Heclo). The emphasis was on getting a proposal that
could be quickly adopted  in order to enhance Clinton's re-election  pros-
pects.  The  task  force tried  to anticipate  all viewpoints  and  work out the
necessary compromises before announcing the plan. The key element in the
task force's proposal was the concept of managed competition,  a "middle-
range, mixed public and private" scheme  that was considered more likely
to succeed than an effort to rally public support behind a full-blown plan of
universal,  government-funded  insurance  (Skocpol,  1993,  p. 539).
2.  Clinton's  managed  competition  concept  was  borrowed  from  the
Jackson Hole Group, which  is the second effort at agreement that is worth
looking at. Founded by Dr. Paul Ellwood, and composed of representatives
of the  major  players  in  health  care,  the  Jackson  Hole  Group  had  been
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Wyoming  (Castro;  Navarro).  Members  included  representatives  of "the
large  insurance  companies,  some  of the  largest employers  in corporate
America, the pharmaceutical  industry and some major professional asso-
ciations"  (Navarro,  p.  206).  The  purpose  of  the  meetings  was  to  air
grievances,  identify  problems and accommodate  differences.  Whenever
unanimity was reached, someone on Ellwood's staff would draft a position
paper,  circulate it for comments,  and then distribute  it among health care
experts and policy makers. The managed competition  proposal was devel-
oped  through  that  process  in  1991.  The  Clinton  task  force  adopted  the
managed competition  idea, but then toughened it in response to opposition
from  advocates  of a Canadian-style  single-payer plan (Navarro;  Castro).
The  single-payer  plan  was  supported  by twenty  major  unions,  senior
citizens groups, African  American and Hispanic groups,  religious organi-
zations  and  other  activist groups  (Navarro,  p.  211).  The  administration
evidently feared that the Jackson Hole proposal would not extend coverage
and  reduce  costs  fast  enough  to  compete  with  what  the  single-payer
advocates  claimed  their plan  would  do  (Castro,  p.  207).  That raises  the
question  of why the  Jackson  Hole  Group's  consensus-building  did  not
accommodate the single-payer objections.  One possible reason is that labor
unions, key supporters of the single-payer  plan, did not participate  in the
Jackson  Hole  Group (despite  Ellwood's constant efforts,  according  to at
least one account-Castro,  p. 82).
3. The third effort  at agreement  worth  looking  at is the  administration's
promised  grassroots  educational  campaign.  There was to  have been  public
education throughout the country. The purpose most likely was more to sell the
plan than to get public input; but, in any case, the campaign never got off the
ground (Skocpol,  1995; Heclo). That failure was a factor that contributed to, or
in any case failed to counteract, the withering of public support. Ensuing events
helped  explain  why public  education  and  support was  important.  If public
support  had  gathered  momentum  instead  of withering,  it  would have  kept
pressure  on  Congress  to  find  agreement  instead  of generating  competing
proposals and eventually taking the easy way out by doing nothing. Why did the
grassroots  campaign  not  get off the  ground?  One reason  was the  fact  that
Clinton's original grassroots plan was criticized as improper use of public funds
for what were called "partisan"  purposes.  So the campaign was moved to the
auspices of  the Democratic National Committee, where it had less funding, and
interest  groups  found  it  harder  to  cooperate  without  jeopardizing  the
nonpartisan stance they wanted to maintain (Skocpol,  1995). But the main
reason  for the campaign  not getting  off the ground  was  that there  was
simply too little time. The "campaign mode" in which the administration's
health care  plan  was developed  and promoted  meant  that there was too
much pressure for a quick decision.
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require a period of what Hugh Heclo calls "gestation" (Heclo). Heclo says
that policy  arguments need to be  sustained long  enough for people  to be
persuaded that a real problem exists that will not go away unless something
is  done.  Yankelovich  adds  the  point  that there  also  needs  to  be  public
understanding of and support for at least the general direction of proposed
solutions. The public needs to be aware of costs and trade-offs-they need
to get beyond "wishful thinking," and not only recognize a problem, but also
come to favor a course of action for which they "accept the consequences."
Heclo makes the observation that the Great Society reforms ofthe 1960s had
a "gestation period"  in the  1950s,  which raises the interesting question  of
why  reforms proposed  in  the1990s  were  not effectively  gestated  in  the
1980s. Heclo's answer is that ideological polarization inhibited the genuine
exploration of conflicting perspectives that gestation requires.
Welfare Reform
So, now  we're debating  welfare reform,  another  major element  in the
social  contract. What are the prospects for a better outcome? I would say
zero. The  motive for welfare reform  is more mean-spirited (although  one
should never assume that poor people want welfare left as it is).  The middle
class is not worried about potential loss of benefits for themselves,  as was
the case, at least initially, in health care reform. Nor is there the structure of
powerful interest groups with a stake in the status quo that inhibited reform
in the health care field.
But there are similarities as well as differences. The central question in both
issues is what society will do for poor people. (Despite the language of  universal
coverage,  it eventually became  clear that the most obvious  beneficiaries  of
health care reform would be the poor and the uninsured.)  In both issues, there
is a high degree of middle-class ambivalence-compassion  for poor people,
mingled with concern for one's own welfare and an inclination to let the poor
fend  for themselves.  And  both  issues  are  greatly  affected  by  ideological
polarization over the size and role of the government.
Requirements
What would "renegotiating  the social contract" require  if it were  to be
done in a democratically responsible way? My reading of the post mortem
on health care reform  suggests four things that are needed:
1. Time  for  gestation.  There  is  nothing  (or,  at  least  very  little)  that
educators  can  do  on  issues  like  these,  where  decisions  will  come  soon.
Heclo's "gestation,"  Yankelovich's "working through" to a "public judg-
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thing) take time. The health care debate does show, however, that decisions may
not come so soon after all.  There may still be ample time for education on these
issues-or at least on a variety of state and local issues related to reform.
2. Consensus-seeking among the active players, with all of them involved.
You can't leave out labor, as in the Jackson Hole Group. (If they refuse to come
to the meetings, you find some other way to get their viewpoint understood and
taken into account.) If  competing proposals are going to emerge anyway, people
who favor those proposals  need to be included in consensus-building efforts
from  the  beginning.  In  addition,  there  is  also  the  problem  that,  whatever
happened  in the Jackson Hole Group or the Clinton task force, the quality of
consensus-seeking certainly deteriorated after the health care debate became
public. In my view, that debate is the most compelling evidence of  all about the
sorry state of our policy making process.  If there was ever a situation where
everyone agreed that something needed to be done, this was it, and yet nothing
was done. The inauthentic politics of ideological polarization reasserted itself,
and the debate became yet another knock-down argument in which winning, or
making the other side look bad, was more important than solving the problem.
3. Public understanding and support.  The public needs to come to grips
with conflicts  and  contradictions  regarding  the  issues.  Wishful  thinking
needs  to  be  replaced  by  a  public judgment-a  judgment  based  on  an
understanding of conflicting perspectives, and capable of holding up in the
face of interest-group counter-arguments.  The need for public understand-
ing  and support means  that the issues cannot be  thrashed out  in secrecy,
beyond the scrutiny of the press and the opportunity for public observation
and  learning.  As  Heclo  says,  secrecy  by the  Clinton task force  "further
dimmed the prospects for educating  Washington  and the public about the
difficult trade-offs at stake" (p. 97).  In the words of another commentator,
"...  the  administration  ended  up  simply  advertising  its  plan  rather  than
having a real public discussion"  (Weir, p.  102).
4. Representation of all sides, including poor people. The poor may have
little power in decision making, but the public (bless its heart) continues to
persistently care about poor people. On welfare reform, public anger about
welfare  continues  to be combined  with  strong feelings that poor people
should not suffer  economic  hardship  or be left  on the  streets  (Altman).
Among the contradictions and trade-offs that need to be weighed in arriving
at a public judgment, are the implications of different proposals for poor
people. If they were present, the voices of poor people would be a valuable
ingredient  in forming a  public judgment (to say nothing  of the fact that
programs for poor people might work better if they were designed with poor
people's input).
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welfare  reform. Articles  that rely on  interviews  with  recipients  are rare
enough  that I  tend to clip  them  when I see them.  I do  not have  a large
collection. One example is an article about illegitimacy in a recent  National
Journal  that begins with an 18-year-old mom's response to the question of
whether cutting welfare benefits would discourage  her and other teenage
mothers from getting pregnant again (Carney). "No,"  she says, "because
some teenagers have children to keep the male friend they're with. Other
teenagers have children because they feel that they want something that'll
love  them  back.  Other  teenagers  have  children  to  be  accompanied  by
another person. It's not for the money."One may not like what she says, but
that's hardly  the  voice  of someone  with  nothing  relevant  to  say  about
welfare reform.
Roles  for Educators
Let me  turn more  specifically  to  the  question  of what  public  issues
educators  should be doing.  Decisions  about health  care and  welfare  are
coming back to the state and local levels. The failure of national health care
reform tells us that, and the trend toward block grants to the states as a key
element  in welfare reform tells us the same thing. Those trends  will give
educators  working at the state and  local levels a fine opportunity to help
bring together the major players in state and local  issues related  to health
care and welfare-not the current issues, but ones coming down the road.
Educators should use what they've learned  about conflict resolution. Get
the various players'  interests,  not their positions, on the table. Help them
talk to one another and  listen to  one another  in a safe forum. Help them
understand  one  another  and  search  for  solutions they can  all  live  with.
Maybe new solutions to contentious issues regarding the social contract can
be worked out. Then, sometime  in the future,  if a need for national action
becomes apparent again,  solutions worked out in states and localities may
get a chance to "trickle up."
There  is a need  for education of citizens, as well as the active players.
Ordinary people need to wrestle with the issues, understand the conflicts
and contradictions,  and make a public judgment. One useful  response by
educators  would be to sponsor citizen discussion groups on the National
Issues Forum (NIF) model. Another important opportunity is for all citizens
(not just those  who  participate  in  discussion  groups)  to  see  the  issues
discussed in ways that include their viewpoints and bring out the contradic-
tions and  possible solutions. This is the  opportunity that gets foreclosed
when the active players deliberate issues and possible solutions in secrecy.
This is also why it's important for public issues educators to build connec-
tions with the news media.
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NIF-type discussion groups, and they need to be represented  in the conver-
sations among  major players.  Think how rarely that happens.  Making  it
happen  is  a  big  challenge-a  blending  of empowerment  and  conflict
resolution strategies. I have a colleague, David Pelletier,  in the Division of
Nutritional  Sciences  at Cornell, who envisions  two basic approaches  for
bringing the perspectives  of ordinary  citizens into  policy-related  discus-
sions.  One  approach  is  direct  involvement  in  the  same conversations-
which  Pelletier  believes  is  ultimately  the best  strategy,  but  one  that is
problematic  because  of inequalities  in power,  status and self-confidence.
The second approach is for the active players to conduct interviews or focus
groups with ordinary citizens in order to tap their viewpoints and bring them
into the active players' discussions. Pelletier hopes to experiment with both
approaches  and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.
Another approach with potential for blending empowerment and conflict
resolution is the Citizen Politics model put forth by Harry Boyte and Project
Public Life at the University of Minnesota (Boyte; Project Public Life). My
reading of Citizen Politics says that it starts with unempowered individuals
or groups, such as poor people-or school kids, parents, tenants, etc.-and
helps them take the initiative to study an issue, identify and interview the
major players, and then bring them together for discussions of the conflict-
resolution variety. The end result is the same thing that Pelletier is aiming
for (consensus-seeking  discussions in which poor people are represented),
but in this case the inequality problem  is addressed by having poor people
initiate the entire process.
The Third Wave
In  whatever  way  it's done,  this  combination  of conflict  resolution  and
empowerment is what l'd like to call the "third wave" of  public issues education.
The first wave was primarily information provision about public issues (often
using the alternatives-and-consequences  approach). The second wave, which
increasing numbers of educators have been joining in recent years, puts major
emphasis on conflict resolution, bringing together people from different sides
ofthe issues to learn, at least in part, from one another. Much ofthis second-wave
work has addressed environmental  issues. This has happened, at least in part,
because the environmental movement succeeded  in demanding a place at the
table-they  became  "empowered"-thereby  making  the  need  for  conflict
resolution obvious to many of the major players. The third wave calls for
educators  to  not wait for  unempowered  groups,  such  as  poor  people  or
welfare recipients,  to empower themselves,  as the environmentalists  did,
but  to  help  with  that  part  of the  process  as  well.  What's  needed  is  a
combination of empowerment  and conflict resolution.
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renegotiated with little help from public issues educators. The fault is partly
ours. We have often avoided social contract issues entirely, or treated them
as  problems  amenable  to  solution  through education  for  individual  and
family decisions, or limited ourselves to "networking"  with other profes-
sionals in programs designed to address essentially noncontroversial issues,
such as service gaps  in child care, teen recreation or housing for seniors.
(Much  of this  is  good work  with  beneficial  results.  I don't mean  to  be
critical.  But  other  things  might  be  more  important.)  Learning  how  to
combine empowerment and conflict resolution is a daunting task, but I think
the stories of health care reform and welfare reform  are stark illustrations
of the consequences  of failing to take  on that task.
The fault is not entirely ours, however. We are not always  working in a
receptive environment.  Often, no one is asking for our help, and they may
not welcome it when it's offered.  For the most part, neither policy makers,
other active players,  the news media nor the public seem  able to envision
different  ways to  make  public  decisions,  so they don't seek the  help  of
educators or anyone else. Policy makers and active players at the national
level still seem committed to the politics of winning and losing. At the local
level, I think policy makers seem more inclined to see policy making as their
exclusive  responsibility  (and sometimes  to resent,  rather than welcome,
partnerships with educators). The news media's dominant metaphor contin-
ues  to  be  the  horse  race,  and  the  public  remains  cynical,  longing  for
something better but not knowing  what to ask for.
Breakthroughs  do occur, however, and I continue to be impressed with
the prevalence of favorable responses  from nearly everyone who gets the
opportunity to participate  in educational programs that facilitate  learning
across conflicting perspectives on contentious  issues. We need to continue
providing those opportunities for more and more audiences, and we need to
accept the challenge of the third wave-turning our capabilities more often
to issues involving the social contract.
' Helpful sources  include special  issues of Journal  of Health Politics, Policy, and
Law, 18 (Summer 1993); PS. Political  Science andPolitics,  27 (June 1994); Health
Affairs,  14  (Spring  1995);  and Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20
(Summer 1995); various issues of National  Journal  and CQ Weekly Report; and the
books by Castro and Navarro  (which help balance  each other's  biases).
2 There was a plausible argument connecting the two goals (although economists
tended to doubt that it would work): Cost control would make universal coverage
affordable;  universal coverage would make cost control possible-by stimulating
more preventive care and getting people out of expensive inappropriate health care
settings (Heclo;  Newhouse).
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